Introduction
In the first part of his article, Fogel attempts to give a general explanation of psychological development and of behavioral changes. According to him new behaviors appearing in the course of development are emergent outcomes of dynamic relationships between partners of the systems under consideration (dyad, triade, etc) . From his point of view new behaviors demonstrated by individuals cannot be explained by their history, but are only the emergent product of their actual exchanges. Out of these interactions arise '(1) the identification and regulation of those parameters whose changes affect the quality and quantity of movement, and (2) the identification of the information required to coordinate perception and action ' (p. 401) . Contrary to this general statement, I consider human behavior as being fundamentally the product of phylo-and ontogenetic history. From birth infants are able to identify certain pieces of information and parameters (certain critical variables) eliciting coordinated actions and consequently giving rise to the quality and quantity of infants' movements in their interactions with the social and physical environment. These capacities result from his/her phylo-and embryogenetic history and must have some substrate that psychologists usually call anticipation and planning capacities, long-term memory or representation (to mention only some possible denominations).
In the second part of his article, Fogel illustrates his discourse by research done during the last ten years. He shows, by means of photographs, how what he calls the attention-posture synergy or the relation between posture (allowed by the mother) and attention (of the baby) oriented away from the mother is an emergent property of the dyadic interactions during the first six months of life. Nevertheless, all the dyads studied reach the same final result ('infant facing and gazing away') but by various roads (synchrony vs. asynchrony between partners).
In the third part, Fogel suggests the types of research that could be done from his perspective: in the field of therapeutic interventions on the one hand and in the field of guidance like for example in walking behavior, on the other hand.
At the end of each part of his article, Fogel expresses statements disconcerting by their generality, such as 'communication is constituted by a dynamic interaction, rather than regulated by a set of schematic rules or simple imitations' (p. 406) or else 'the psychosocial meaning of a movement is not genetically pre-adapted, but rather depends on the temporal and spatial relationship of the movement in combination with all other features of the social system, including its cognitive and motivational aspects' (p. 417). Fogel's project has some similarities with Piaget's attempt to explain sensorimotor development without resorting to the concept of representation (Piaget 1936 (Piaget /1977 (Piaget , 1967 (Piaget /1971 when she spoke about new jargon for old problems: 'my caution is against a new jargon to address old problems and a possible overuse of systems concepts' (Horowitz 1989: 212) .
It is true, and we can concede this to Fogel, that development in general, and social development in particular are still too often exclusively described as an invariant succession of steps. But it is equally undeniable that development is charaterized just as well by 'universal' aspects ('that appear in all normal members of the species as they develop') as by 'non-universal' aspects, to quote Horowitz again (1989: 215) . It is also necessary to distinguish, as I have done elsewhere, between non-specific and specific roles of the environment in relation to the structural and functional aspects of behavior (Mounoud 1979 (Mounoud /1981 (Mounoud , 1984 (Mounoud , 1992 . I would also like to point out that presently environment is considered as producing selection and impoverishment as well as enrichment and differentiation (Changeux 1983; Edelman 1987; Mounoud 1990) .
It is also true, again to Fogel's relief, that infants are still too often considered in isolation, independently of the social system they belong to. But it is equally obvious that from the beginning of the century many researchers have fought against this tendency. As an example, I will mention Balint (1935) (Fivaz 1987; Corboz et al. 1989) .
Finally, it is obvious that when two individuals interact -'a man touching a woman.. . ' (p. 417) to use Fogel's example -it is not possible from the very particularities of each partner to foresee exactly the form and content of their relationship ('unpredictable outcomes'!) which will eventually constitute in a certain sense emergent properties of the system. But in order to grasp correctly the dynamic of the interaction, it is important to define each partner's history by means of what psychologists call scripts, schemas, memories, representations producing various expectations and anticipations. These schemas or scripts can be more or less general, more or less specific. They determine sets of potential behauiors. Now, Fogel rejects all 'prescriptive' theories in such an extreme way that his conception is caricatural. He reaches a peak when he writes 'Furthermore, there is nothing in the dynamic perspective specifying that the relationship needs to be tutorial, asymmetrical, motivated or even positive' (p. 405). Without any of these features it is possible to assert without taking risk that no developmental process can take place. Furthermore, Fogel should agree with such a judgement since he writes without fear for contradiction that 'the psychosocial meaning of a movement. , . depends..
. on other features of the social system, including its cognitive and motivational aspects'. Similarily in the last paragraph of his article, he recognizes the asymmetrical form of the adult-child relationships, 'Forms of co-regulation in symmetrical social relationships are likely to be different than those found in asymmetrical adult-child relationships' (p. 419). Consequently, it would be necessary for Fogel to specify precisely which roles these cognitive, motivational or asymmetrical aspects play and how they work (after having denied the necessity of their specification).
Critique of the data
From a longitudinal piece of study in preparation, Fogel describes mothers followed weekly with their baby between 1 and 6 months in the following way. Their behaviors could be described by two cornponents:
-a first component, stable over time, drives the mothers to produce more position changes to her baby when s/he looks away than when s/he is looking at her; _ a second component, variable over time, drives the mother between 1 and 6 months to spend an increasing amount of time holding her baby upright.
Fogel strongly rejects the idea that mothers could have acquired during their onto-and phylogeneses event schemes or representations which could determine these two types of behavior. He prefers to think that despite their generality ('universality') these two types of maternal behavior spontaneously emerge as properties of the dyadic system. 'Adults' action, no less than children's, is (co-lconstructed as part of a process of mutual dynamic interaction' (pp. 401). 'Neither partner has a foreknowledge or scheme of the underlying parameters and task invariants; they must be discovered via interaction' (pp. 403-4041, ' . . . a process of co-regulation in which the adult changes as much as the child' (p. 417). In order to be consistent, Fogel should have said that these parameters are discovered only during the time of the interaction and that outside this interaction they have no existence (at all), failing that he would have to admit the notion of schema. In any case, starting with the two general components of mother's behavior, Fogel describes two possible evolutions of the attentionposture synergy: one category of dyads for which infants' behavior 'gazing away' is synchronized with the postural facing away as held by the mother and another category of asynchronous dyads for which the infant's 'gazing away' appears without (i.e. a few weeks before) the 'looking away posture' realized by the mother.
Despite divergent synergies all dyads studied by Fogel 'have negotiated a posture-attention relationship oriented away from the mother' (p. 415). Again from the same longitudinal study, Fogel describes all the babies as spending an increasing amount of time between 1 and 6 months gazing away from the mother. He does not distinguish between frequency or duration of the babies' gazes as do some authors (cf. for example Friedman et al. 1976) . Of course, this behavior is presented as an emergent property. Consequently, this behavior should be specific to a given type of systems (dyads). Nervertheless, as already mentioned, this behavior seems independent of the particularities (or specificities) of the dyads under study. Fogel's refusal to consider in his conceptualization motivational variables (such as for example the attention-habituation)
does not allow him to call upon various economical explanations.
Once more, I will quote Horowitz (1989: 216) : 'Even in the analysis of emergent universal behaviors..
. those aspects of the acquisition that involve learning components and the operation of contingent feedback principles must be amenable to a learning analysis'.
I would have expected at least a more articulated demonstration of Fogel's dynamic interpretation in order to understand for example how various degrees of stability in a dyadic system could be defined or also how attractors could be characterized.
In the first research presented by Fogel, he actually tried to establish an invariant relationship between inclination of the infant's seat (i.e. the postural positions) at 3, 4 and 5 months of age and various percentages of infant's gazes at his/her mother. Mothers were requested to maintain 'a similar style of interaction' despite the variation of a basic component of the system. Behavior requested from the mother should have been impossible in Fogels conception since he considers that 'if one component changes, the entire pattern of action may change as the system settles into a new synergy' (p. 41.5). Could it be that in some cases prescriptions are actually working? To conclude, I will examine the following statement suggested by Fogel's article: in order to produce a given result on partner B (the infant), it is necessary that the action of partner A (the mother) acts upon the relevant parameters (of the situation). With regard to such a (obvious) statement, I will briefly consider two possible situations:
(1) If these parameters are known by partner A (the mother needs to have 'some form of representing a more skilled action', p. 
